Introduction
The collective management of water and other natural resources is increasingly being recognised as a key determinant of economic performance, especially in the rural sector of developing economies (Platteau, 1991; Balland and Platteau, 1996;  Ostrom, 2003; Bardhan et al., 2006) . By its nature, collective action involves interdependency among individuals. 1 This, combined with the non-excludable and rival nature of many natural resources, poses signi…cant challenges and raises the question of whether individuals are capable to successfully manage resources held in common.
Over the past decades, signi…cant advancements have been made in the collective action literature and the earlier conventional wisdom that the users of a common resource are inevitably trapped in a process leading to overuse and degradation (Hardin 1968 ) is no longer regarded as the only relevant view. Using multiple methods of analysis, scholars from di¤erent disciplines have shown that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable. 2 Importantly, they have made considerable progress in identifying the conditions that are most likely to in ‡u-ence the success of collective action and collective good provision. These include:
(i) users group characteristics, such as group size and heterogeneity; (ii) institutional arrangements; and (iii) physical attributes of common-pool resources (Sandler, 1992; Agrawal, 2007; Ostrom, 2007 ). Yet, as suggested by Ostrom and colleagues, advancing our understanding of collective action problems requires 1 For example, the maintenance of an irrigation network requires the stabilization of the rims and the cleaning of minor channels across farmers' land. In this context, the e¤ort of one farmer is likely to in ‡uence the activity of other farmers along the network, thus implying strategic interactions among individual users. 2 Examples of collective behaviour have been identi…ed in a wide range of contexts. These include the management of …sheries (e.g., Acheson, 2003; Singleton, 1999) , forests (e.g., Mckean, 1986 Mckean, , 2000 Schoonmaker Freudnberger 1993) , pastures (e.g., Gilles et al. 1992; Netting, 1981; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999) , and groundwater resources (e.g., Blomquist 1992; Trawick, 2003; Marchiori et al., 2012) .
further investigation of the relationships between these key dimensions, as well as of broader contextual variables (Poteete et al., 2010) . This paper focuses on the mechanisms linking heterogeneity, institutions and incentives within the context of water resources. Speci…cally, it investigates whether and how land inequality -which is taken here as an exogenous source of heterogeneity -a¤ects the allocation rule that maximises the amount of water collectively provided. 3 In order to trace the fundamental trade-o¤s that relate initial inequality to the optimal water allocation rule, we introduce a stylised model in which two types of farmer, with unequal land endowments, can voluntarily contribute to a joint project for the maintenance of an irrigation network.
Maintenance activity increases the amount of water e¤ectively available. The collective output (water) is then distributed according to some allocation rule and used by each farmer in combination with land to produce a …nal good.
We …nd that the initial degree of inequality does a¤ect the optimal allocation rule, and that the nature of such relationship depends on technological features such as the complementarity between agents' e¤orts in the realization of the collective good. More precisely, we identify two key forces, which a¤ect the distribution of water in opposite directions. The …rst force, which is referred to as 'e¤ort-augmenting', seeks to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort by pushing the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher marginal return to water.
Due to the assumed complementarity between land and water in the production 3 The paper approaches the problem from a non-cooperative perspective, by studying how inequality and rules a¤ect agents' incentives to contribute in a Nash equilibrium. This is generally regarded as the natural starting point in this kind of analyses. A possible extension for future research is to study the problem from a cooperative perspective. In a cooperative setting, considerations of bargaining power become particularly important. This may require a more explicit account of possible relationships between inequality and power. Other factors we abstract from here, but may a¤ect cooperative decision-making include reciprocity and social norms. The importance of such factors for the emergence of cooperative behaviours have been shown, for example, by Bicchieri (2006) and, within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework, by Sethi and Somanathan (1996; and Noailly et al. (2007) . of the …nal good, this is the agent with the larger endowment of land. This force is the prominent force when e¤orts are highly substitute. Typically, however, the production technology for the collective good displays some degree of complementarity between agents'e¤orts. In such cases, the e¤ort mix, alongside with aggregate e¤ort, becomes critical for the level of collective good provision.
Hence, a second force kicks in, which seeks to correct the e¤ort-augmenting effect by distributing water so as to reach the optimal mix of e¤ort. As we will show, this 'e¤ort-mix'force calls for more egalitarian or even progressive water allocation rules.
The role of inequality has been much debated in the collective action literature, with theoretical works suggesting that inequality can have either positive (Olson, 1965 ; Alix-Garcia, 2007), negative (Ostrom, 1990) The forces identi…ed in this paper and the way they depend on technological features contribute to shed some light on the mechanisms linking inequality, rules and incentives. The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the features of the model. Section 3.1 derives and discusses the main results. Further discussion is provided in section 3.2, where a special case for the production technology of the collective good is considered. Section 4 concludes.
Model setup 2.1 De…nitions and assumptions
Consider two types of farmer: 1 and 2. Each type is endowed with an amount of irrigable land l i , with l i > 0 and i = f1; 2g. Let l l 1 +l 2 denote the total amount of land in the economy. Farmers'endowments can then be de…ned as: l 1 = l and l 2 = (1 ) l, with 2 (0; 1). In the remainder of the paper, we normalize l to one and assume > 0:5. The two types can, therefore, be interpreted as the representatives of two di¤erent farmer groups: large landowners (type 1), and small landowner (type 2).
Farmers can voluntarily engage in a joint project for the maintenance of a network of irrigation channels. Collective-maintenance activity increases the supply of water available for irrigation. Better maintenance, for example, leads to lower losses from …ltration, leakage and sedimentation. The output of the project, Z, is represented by the average water ‡ow delivered through the system and is a function of farmers'e¤orts: e 1 , e 2 . Speci…cally, we parametrize the production technology for Z by using a CES production function:
where < 1 measures the degree of complementarity between individual e¤orts.
Agents' e¤orts are assumed to be unobservable (or not enforceable). The collective output, Z, is divided among farmers according to some allocation rule
, where 1 and 2 are farmers' shares in Z, with 1 ; 2 0 and 1 + 2 = 1. When convenient, we will simplify the notation as follows:
The amount of water allocated to a farmer according to the allocation rule is given by z i = i Z with i = f1; 2g. Each agent uses two inputs, land and water, to produce a …nal good. Agent i's payo¤ is de…ned as:
where f (l i ; z i ) is the individual production function for the …nal good and e i is i's contribution for the maintenance of the irrigation network.
We assume that the cost of e i units of e¤ort is simply e i and that the pro-duction technology for the …nal good is well represented by the following Cobb-
; with 2 (0; 1)
From the complementarity between l i and z i in (2), it follows that the marginal return to water is an increasing function of land.
Although the paper focuses on land inequality as the only source of heterogeneity, an alternative interpretation is possible, which views the parameter as capturing some characteristic of an agent, such as skills or locational di¤erences.
As long as these characteristics a¤ect the marginal productivity of water, this alternative interpretation is consistent with the analysis.
Individual optimization problem
Each agent chooses the level of e¤ort that maximizes her own payo¤, given the contribution made by the other. Speci…cally, for any given expectation e 2 about the level of e¤ort exerted by agent 2, type 1 solves the following problem
The …rst-order condition is:
From (1), the derivative of Z with respect to e 1 can be written as:
By substituting (4) into (3) and upon some calculation, we have:
Similarly, one can de…ne type 2's optimization problem and obtain:
(e 2 ) = ( ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
By substituting (5) and (6) into equation (1) and rearranging the terms, the following expression for Z can be derived:
where ( ) . 7 Equation (7) represents the amount of collective output produced in equilibrium. 
which leads to e 1 1 = ( ) ( )
Raising both side to the power of =( 1), we have
which is equivalent to equation (5) . The same step-by-step derivation applies to equation (6) once we have changed the index of the player from 1 to 2 in the maximisation problem. 7 Notice that , and are only well de…ned if 6 = 1 and 6 = 1, which will be assumed in the reminder of the paper. 8 It can be shown that there exists another solution which involves e i = 0 for all i. This, however, will be disregarded, as it implies Z = 0. The analysis will, instead, focus on the non-trivial equilibrium in which the collective output is positive.
Results

Inequality and Rules
In this section, we start by identifying the distribution of water that maximises the collective output produced in equilibrium, and then proceed to analyse how that is a¤ected by inequality in initial conditions -as represented by > 0:5.
The problem can be expressed as follows:
If a solution interior to the interval [0,1] exists, then the following FOC must hold:
(1 )
= 0
Notice that, for 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; 1) the …rst two terms in (9) are strictly positive.
Condition (9) can, therefore, be simpli…ed as follows:
By substituting for = 1 and solving with respect to , we obtain:
where:
(1 ) (1 ) .
It can be shown that for <
1+
the maximization problem in (8) admits the interior solution derived above. Equation (11) can be interpreted as a 'weighted' index of the degree of inequality characterizing the economy. More precisely, inequality in land distribution is weighted by the parameter , which is a function of two elements: (i) the strategic importance of agents'e¤orts in the realization of the collective good as measured by ; and (ii) the relative importance of water compared to land in the production of the …nal good as measured by .
From (11), the derivative of with respect to is:
with
. Given 2 (0; 1), the sign of
in (12) is the same as the sign of . Moreover, within the range of parameter values <
, the sign of varies as follows: < 0 for < 0; and > 0 for 2 0;
. We show in the appendix that, for 2
; 1 , Z is still increasing in at the value = 1. In this case, the supply of irrigation water is maximized by setting = 1 for any > 0:5. Hence, the relationship between inequality and rules can be summarized as follows: 9 The appendix also shows that the other possible corner solution, = 0, can never be a global maximum for any 0:5.
For < 0 that is, as one moves towards relatively high degree of complementarity between agents'e¤orts the collective output is maximized by allocating a relatively larger share of water to the small landowner. The opposite holds within the interval 2 0;
that is, for lower degrees of complementarity.
In this case, assigning more water to the large landowner favours the provision of the collective good and the share of the large landowner increases as inequality in land holding becomes more pronounced. Finally, when agents'contributions display relatively high degrees of substitutability that is for 2
; 1 the supply of irrigation water is maximized by allocating all the water available to the large landowner, independently of the degree of inequality in landholding (i.e., for any > 0:5).
How can these results be interpreted? In the context of the present analysis, it is possible to identify two key forces which a¤ect the distribution of water in opposite directions. We refer to the …rst force as 'e¤ort-augmenting'. This force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher marginal return to water in the attempt to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort. Due to the complementarity between land and water in the production of the …nal good, this is the agent with the larger endowment of land. The e¤ort-augmenting force is the prominent force when the production technology for the collective good displays relatively high degrees of substitutability among agents' e¤orts (i.e. for strictly positive values of ). However, collective activities associated with the management of water resources generally display some complementarity in e¤orts. In the presence of complementarity, aggregate e¤ort is not all that matters; indeed, the e¤ort mix is also important. Inequality may hamper the achievement of the optimal e¤ort-mix (with negative consequences on collective output) because it reduces the incentives to contribute of the small landowner.
Hence, a second force kicks in, which seeks to 'correct'for this by distributing water in a more progressive manner so as to reach the optimal mix of e¤ort. For su¢ cient complementarity ( < 0), this 'e¤ort-mix'force tends to dominate. 10 The use of water as an incentive mechanism has consequences that might seem at …rst glance counterintuitive in that it implies allocating more water to the agent with lower marginal returns. This, however, may still represent the 'constrained'optimum when other contracting possibilities are not available, as in the context considered here where e¤ort is unobservable. Furthermore, in some institutional settings contracting over output may also be di¢ cult due to lack of commitment on the part of the producers or to limited enforcement capacity on the part of governmental authorities. 11 
Collective production function: A special case
This section discusses a special case for the production technology of the collective good, which generates an interesting result as far as the interaction between inequality and rules is concerned. Speci…cally, we assume that the production technology for Z is well represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale: 12 10 Applications of a similar idea can be found in the case study literature in relation to other forms of heterogeneity. In some villages in Nepal, for instance, institutional arrangements have been used to moderate the e¤ects of locational heterogeneity on users'incentives to monitor and maintain their resources, by allowing more distant members to pay lower fees in exchange for more time spent in monitoring and maintenance work ( 11 For simplicity, the model proposed in this paper assumes that output is deterministic. However, in the rural sector of developing economies, output tends to be highly sensitive to idiosincratic shocks. This, in turn, gives room to opportunistic behaviour by the parties -who might have an incentive to cheat about the amount of output being produced -thus adding further di¢ culties to the possibility of contracting over output. 12 As explained in section 2, this can be thought of as a limit case of the CES production function. Z = F (e 1 ; e 2 ) = e 1 e (1 ) 2 (13) with 2 (0; 1). Type 1's maximization problem can be written as follows:
The FOC for the above problem is given by:
From (13), the derivative of Z with respect to e 1 is:
By substituting (15) into (14) and solving with respect to e 1 , the following reaction function can be derived:
Similarly, from type 2's maximization problem we have:
(1
Solving the system of farmers'reaction functions, the following equilibrium levels of e¤ort can be obtained:
where: g 1 (1 ) , and g 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )
.
The collective output produced in equilibrium is:
The allocation scheme that maximizes the provision of the collective good is given by the rule that solves the following equation:
Note that (17) is not well de…ned for = 0 and = 1. In what follows, we assume 2 (0; 1). Under this assumption, the …rst term in (17) is strictly positive since the parameters , and vary within the interval (0; 1). Condition (17) can, therefore, be simpli…ed as follows:
From (18), we have: = . Thus, collective output is maximised by allocating water according to farmers'marginal productivity of e¤ort (MPE). This would imply equal distribution of water when MPE is identical across farmers.
The Cobb-Douglas production technology, hence, leads to a special case in which the two forces identi…ed in section 3.1 perfectly o¤set one another and the allocation rule is independent of the degree of inequality in land-holding.
Conclusions
This paper focused on collective action problems associated with the management of water resources at the local level. Speci…cally, it considered a situation in which two types of farmer, with unequal land endowments, can voluntarily engage in collective maintenance activities to enhance the amount of water available.
Water is distributed according to some allocation rule and used by each farmer as an input of production in combination with land. Within this context, we investigated the relationship between land inequality and water allocation rules, by determining whether and how the former a¤ects the distribution of water that maximises collective good provision.
We found that two opposing forces are at work. The logic behind the …rst force (e¤ort-augmenting) is to maximise the aggregate level of e¤ort. In the attempt to do so, such force pushes the distribution of water towards the agent with the higher marginal return to water. The complementarity between land and water in the production of the …nal good implies that the marginal return to water increases with land; consequently, the …rst force works in favour of the large landowner. The second force (e¤ort-mix) seeks to allocate water so as to reach the optimal mix of e¤ort and calls instead for more egalitarian or even progressive water allocation rules.
The trade-o¤ between these two forces depends on technological features of the problem. Speci…cally, the …rst force is the prominent force when the production technology for the collective good is characterised by relatively high degrees of substitutability among e¤orts. In this case, the allocation rule that maximises collective output is such that a larger share of water is assigned to the large landowner and the share of the large landowner increases with the degree of inequality in land-holding. This result is in line with the Olson's argumentnamely, inequality may favour collective good provision by enhancing the interest of the richest agent. However, this is not generally the case when the production technology for the collective good displays (as it typically does) some degree of complementarity. In particular, for su¢ cient complementarity we found that the e¤ort-mix e¤ect becomes relatively more important and so does the second force; in this case, more egalitaria or even progressive rules perform better in terms of collective good provision.
Although the paper focused on land inequality (measured by the exogenous parameter lambda), an alternative interpretation is possible that views lambda as capturing some characteristic of an agent, such as skills or locational di¤erences.
There are several avenues along which to extend the present work. Here, we focused on the class of linear sharing rules; indeed, although the amount of water that each player receives depends on aggregate water output, the shares per se do not. The analysis of more general classes of mechanisms, where the shares may also vary with the level of output, could provide further insights. The paper examines how inequality and rules a¤ect agents'incentives to contribute in a Nash-equilibrium; that is, it concentrates on the non-cooperative case. A second extension could be to study the problem from a cooperative perspective.
In a cooperative setting, considerations of bargaining power become particularly important; this may require a more explicit account of possible relationships between inequality and power. Finally, it would be interesting to test the predictions of the model in laboratory or even …eld experiments; this could enrich the experimental literature on the subject by providing new insights and inter-pretations. For example, experiments based on linear public good games could be extended to account for the possibility that agents' e¤orts display varying degrees of complementarity, and heterogeneity a¤ects the marginal bene…ts from contributing through the relationship between private and collective inputs.
Appendix
In the context of the present analysis, is the solution to the following maximization problem: .
By substituting for = 1 , the FOC for the above problem can be expressed as follows: Consider …rst = 1. This will be a maximum if @Z @ > 0 when approaches one. In that case, Z would still be increasing in at the value = 1.
Notice that, when the exponent of (1 ) in equation (a:2) is negative, it cannot be true that = 1, because: , the magnitude 1 1 is negative, and the solution to (a:1)
is, therefore, given by equation (11) .
For >
1+
, we have:
(1 ) ( 1 1) = 0
Therefore:
(1 ) (1 1 ) (1 ) , Z is maximised by setting = 1.
Consider now the limit case = 0. It is easy to prove that this can never be a global maximum within the compact set [0; 1]. Let: 
